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Since the early 1990s, Malawi has tried to undertake economic reforms, including the
restructuring of the public sector, even as it embraced democratic reforms. Paucity of
human and financial resources has made the process difficult and drawn out. However,
towards the end of the 1990s, the reforms began to bear fruit. Notably, the efficiency of the
civil service improved, while the government continued to emphasise the importance of
accountability and established an agency to fight corruption.
This chapter analyses the factors, which have influenced public sector reforms in Malawi,
with emphasis on the nature of reforms implemented by the government and the incentive
structure in the civil service. Not unlike many other African countries, top political support
has been important for the successful implementation of public sector reform in Malawi.
However, sustainability will only be ensured when support for the programmes is spread
among broad sections of the population.
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1. Introduction
Since independence, Malawi’s public sector has gone through three distinct phases, related
closely to the performance of the economy. Between the achievement of independence in
the early 1960s and the end of the 1970s, the generally high commodity export prices had
led to above average GDP growth, close to of 3 percent per annum and capita. Combined
with macroeconomic stability, this period of unbroken growth provided a basis for public
sector expansion. Before the end of the period, public investment accounted for two-thirds
of total investment. However, the government failed to translate these investment outlays
into social welfare improvements. Health and education expenditure remained below 6
percent of GDP in the late 1960s, falling to about 5 percent already by the mid 1970s (Prior
1990: 173).
The second period, 1980-94, saw the economy and the public sector enter a period of
serious imbalance. There were severe shocks, including increases in oil prices and
transport costs related to external trade, as routes through Mozambique were disrupted by
civil war. The war in the neighbouring country forced up to 750,000 refugees into Malawi,
at a time when it was experiencing severe drought. Investments dropped sharply and
foreign reserves dwindled. Growth for the period 1980-94 was only 1.6 percent. The
budget deficit, rising to 15 percent in 1980 alone, averaged above 10 percent during 1981-
7, and again hit 15 percent in 1994. In the early 1990s donors withdrew their balance of
payments support to Malawi to demonstrate their increasing concern with both the poor
fiscal discipline of the government and its human rights violations. The donor community
also hoped that aid retrenchment would force the government to hold multiparty elections.
The most recent period, from the mid 1990s up to the end of the millennium, saw the
election of a democratic government in 1994 and the introduction of a new structural
adjustment programme in 1995 with broad-based support from the donor community.
Aside from policies for macroeconomic stabilisation, the government also introduced
structural reforms with implications for the public sector. They included privatisation,
deregulation, regulatory reform, liberalisation of agricultural markets, including the
phasing out of the price control and subsidisation regimes, and the reform of the civil
service. Towards the end of the 1990s, the reform efforts were starting to bear fruit. The
economy, which had earlier stagnated, grew by 5.5 percent per annum during the latter half
of the decade. This resumption of growth improved voter sentiment and probably explains
the ruling party’s re-election in 1999.
In Malawi the case for a well-functioning public service sector is a stark one. Per capita
GDP was only US$163 in 1999, while close to 70 percent of the population was living
below the poverty line and life expectancy at birth was only about 43 years. Given a
narrow tax base, recurrent government expenditure is very low, estimated at less than
US$30 per capita in the 1998/99 budget year. The government is thus not in a position to
meet the huge expenditures on education and training required to reverse the serious
shortage of human capital nor the investments in infrastructure and maintenance necessary
to alleviate the transport constraints of landlocked Malawi.
The marginal benefit of improved living standards is thus clearly very large in Malawi.
However, the growth enhancing and poverty reducing economic policies needed to ensure2
this require the creation of an efficient and accountable public sector. In poor countries the
latter is a more crucial precondition for development than in much richer countries, where
there are less growth constraints (Goldsmith 2000).
At least since the dawn of independence, the government has tried to raise public sector
efficiency by designing and adopting reform programmes (Msosa 1998). Progress was
intermittent, however, making it necessary, with the coming to power of a new government
in 1994, to undertake a thorough review of the public sector.
The purpose of this chapter is to study the nature of public sector reforms in Malawi and to
analyse their impact on governance and accountability. Section 2 provides a theoretical
background to good governance and public sector reform, while section 3 looks at the
evolution of Malawi’s public sector reforms. Section 4 looks at changes in employment
and wages in the public sector, while section 5 discusses the issue of accountability in
government, and the steps being taken to ensure that it takes root. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. Public sector reform and good governance: the issues
Although public sector reforms are difficult and complex, making a good record of
performance hard to establish, they are important for the promotion of good governance in
Sub-Saharan Africa (see Collier and Gunning 1999). In our context, governance can be
defined as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the
management of a nation’s affairs. Good governance is when this authority is used to
stimulate and promote sustainable development (Mugore 1997, Shacter 2000). It is thus
closely related to the functioning of the state in a democratic society: with separation of
powers between the legislative, the judiciary and the executive. The legislature sets policy
goals, objectives and rules. The judiciary determines whether the aforementioned are
adhered to and sanctions errant practices. The executive, that is the political leadership as
well as the civil service, implements the policies agreed upon. Obviously, for good
governance to be realised the three branches of a democratic society have to work in
tandem.1
Schacter (2000) has argued, however, that it is almost impossible to find an African
government that is more efficient in policy implementation in the new millennium than it
was in the 1980s. There are a number of reasons for the poor outcomes. First, there has
generally been a lack of a holistic approach to public sector reform in most African
countries. In recent years donors have tended to influence the nature and speed of
economic reforms more than domestic policymakers. Structural adjustment reforms are
illustrative. The public sector components of the reforms focused on areas emphasised by
multilateral and bilateral agencies such raising efficiency in the civil service and state
divestiture. In the area of legal and judicial reforms, again issues close to the donor
constituency, such as human rights protection, were emphasised. Invariably there was less
emphasis on issues of co-ordination of the various reforms to meet domestic needs and
enhance local capacities. The recent emphasis on the inclusion of civil society in
1 There are countries that have achieved rapid growth and rising living standards without fulfilling these
requirements for good governance (e.g. South Korea). However, it seems unlikely that this can be repeated in
Sub-Saharan Africa given the experience of the last 35 years.3
policymaking can also be seen in similar light. It switched the focus once again to issues of
access to policymakers and services, via decentralisation and empowerment of the
citizenry, championed by donors. However, these shifts in emphasis precluded a more
systematic and long-term approach to public sector reform in many countries in Africa
(Mugore 1997).
Second, the domestic co-ordination of public sector reforms has generally been poor.
Ministries have conducted their own internal reforms with little attempt at synchronising
with other agencies. Notably, local government reforms have been poorly coordinated with
those in the line ministries of finance, health and education. The situation is thus often
aggravated by the fact that donors tend to favour portions of the reform project, which they
fund accordingly, neglecting the other components that do not appeal to them. This could
leave important facets of the reform programmes poorly funded, thus making a mockery of
the whole.
Third, and rather ironically, although public sector reform seeks to enhance accountability
in government, its implementation has in many countries been a study in poor
accountability and transparency, with little information reaching the public and with much
of the programme shrouded in secrecy and poorly explained to the electorate. This has
meant that few of the public sector reforms are ‘owned’ by the populations, and continue to
be seen as impositions from outside.
In spite of the problems of implementation, good governance continues to be highlighted
by both donor and recipient governments as crucial for reform success. It is argued in the
literature that by favouring controls and rent-seeking behaviour, bad governance crowds
out the private sector, generates uncertainty, and thus reduces investment. With controls
driven to the extreme, governments become seriously inefficient, patrimonial and
predatory (Mutahaba et al. 1993, Lienert and Modi 1997). Corruption is an oft-cited
example of the outcomes of bad governance. While, in the 1980s, corruption was
sometimes seen as important for ‘unclogging’ the rampant system of controls, increasing
public sector efficiency by supplying public services at market-determined prices, there is
widespread agreement that its effects are negative (Bardhan 1997). Empirical results relate
it to lower investment and thus lower growth. It also lowers expenditure on basic services
and generally reduces the productivity of public investment as well as that of the public
sector (Tanzi 2000).
Theory and empirical evidence suggest four determinants of corruption in the public
sector: opportunities for corruption, the level of remuneration of the civil service, the
extent of controls, and effectiveness of penalties (Bardhan 1997, Van Rijckeghem and
Weder 1997). Opportunities for corrupt behaviour are directly related to the control regime
supported by the government. The proliferation of permits and licences in a regime rife
with shortages creates enormous rents which accrue directly to those administering the
system, while poor remuneration is also often blamed for causing corruption (Van
Rijckeghem and Weder 1997). Still, it is not clear what the optimal level of wages in the
public sector should be. If civil servants exhibit maximising behaviour, increasing their
wages might, on its own, fail to resolve the incentive problem. However, if their behaviour
is ‘satisficing’, they might abstain from corruption when they perceive their wages to be
fair. In the latter case, small wage increases will have a large productivity effect (Van
Rijckeghem and Weder 1997). Still, even if wages were to increase, penalties will only be
effective in reducing corruption if they are relatively high and their enforcement rigorous.4
Among economists, a stable macroeconomic environment, absence of government-induced
market distortions, and the efficient provision of social and infrastructure services
comprise ‘good’ policy. However, although broad adoption of adjustment programmes in
Africa is seen as indicating a willingness to embrace ‘good’ policies, in practice few Sub-
Saharan governments have implemented them fully. As a result of factors ranging from
poor incentive structures, weak monitoring and supervision, lack of transparency and
inadequate legislation, public administration in Africa remains extremely inefficient. This
is depicted by poor value for money in service delivery, wastage of resources, low morale
among employees and outright corruption.
In the economic literature, the ‘principal-agent’ model has been used to analyse the impact
of poor incentives.2 The principal-agent problem arises because contracts between agents,
for example employees and employers, are incomplete, with compliance requiring
monitoring. In trying to reach an incentive-compatible contract the principal is constrained
by the need to overcome the agent’s participation constraint. The contract offered must at
least satisfy the agent’s ‘reservation’ utility. Moreover, to discourage shirking and other
costly behaviour on the part of the agent, the wage or incentive offered must be such that
the threat of dismissal is credible i.e. it is sufficient to instil discipline. However, the
principal-agent framework, while insightful, tends to project too simplified a view.
Typically, there are hierarchies of ‘principals’ and ‘agents’ in the public sector. In a
democracy, citizens are the principals of the parliament, which in turn is the principal of
the cabinet. The cabinet is itself the principal of the civil service etc. There are also
principal-agent relations between the president and his ministers, ministers and their
permanent secretaries, and the latter and the staff of the ministries. When institutions are
weak, such a formal framework tends to be displaced by informal lines of authority based
on patronage, ethnic affiliation and corruption (Wescott 1996; Kaluwa and Musila 2000).
The monitoring problems in the principal-agent model discussed above arise from lack of
transparency. If, for example, the budgetary process of the government is opaque, it is
difficult for the parliament to scrutinise the government’s intentions as demanded by the
electorate. It simply does not have enough information to do so. Similarly, if public sector
job descriptions are poorly specified, imposing disciplinary measures or devising an
adequate level of remuneration will be next to impossible. The importance of transparency
was powerfully demonstrated in Uganda when the government published the amounts of
money it was disbursing to the districts in the local newspapers, making recipients aware
of what to expect. With regard to primary schools, financial flows from the central
government that reached their targets at the district level rose considerably as a result of
the increased level of transparency in the disbursement process (Reinikka 2001).
Evaluation, or after-the-fact monitoring, is another means of ensuring compliance. There
is, however, little point in evaluation when poor performance cannot be punished. In
practice, especially where job descriptions are imprecise, it can be difficult to prove that
employees are guilty of misconduct. Moreover, given the correlation between punishment,
the risk of getting caught and the wage level, creating an effective system of deterrents is
difficult. If, for example, the penalty is generally considered too hash and thus viewed as
unfair by onlookers, enforcers will be reluctant to apply it. Similarly, when wages are low,
2 See Lazear (1995) for reviews of the literature on incentives in organizations.5
society takes a more lenient view of corruption in the public service. Since softer deterrents
do not work either, the answer seems to lie in fundamental reform of the incentive structure
of the public service (Tanzi 1998).
3. The evolution of Malawi’s public sector reforms
3.1 Introduction
Although recent developments have been dramatic, with pressures from all sides, the very
first efforts at public sector reform in Malawi were embarked on immediately after the
attainment of independence in the early 1960s. A major concern at the time was how to
manage the transition from an expatriate-based civil service to one dominated by Africans.
With the goal of limiting the cost of running the post-colonial public service, the Skinner
Commission, established in 1964, recommended lower salaries and job reclassification for
African employees taking over the civil service. These recommendations were adopted and
the salary scales were compressed accordingly. However, very little effort was allotted the
more important task of creating incentives in the public sector in order to ensure the
efficient provision of basic services in, for example, education, agriculture, healthcare and
communications.
With the goal of incorporating these concerns, the Economic Commission for Africa
commissioned a study in 1966, which recommended measures aimed at increasing public
sector efficiency and improving administrative capacities in state institutions. Still,
precisely because implementation capacities were missing in government, few of its
recommendations were adopted (Msosa 1998). Equally ineffective was the Herbecq
Review Commission of 1985 whose recommendations on staff structure, career
development and job grading, which were meant to improve the quality of the service,
while putting a cap on employment, were not fully implemented. The number of civil
servants continued to grow rapidly during the 1980s.
During the 1990s a number of policy reviews and programmes directed at reforming the
public sector were attempted, often simultaneously. Among them were a public sector
management review, civil service pay and employment study, civil service action plan, the
poverty alleviation programme, functional reviews of the ministries, decentralisation and
formation of local government policy reform, medium term expenditure framework, and
sector investment programmes. Since the earlier problems of paucity of human resources
and managerial capacities persisted, the implementation of this new crop of programmes
was slow and unsatisfactory. However, in comparison to the early 1990s, public sector
performance has improved in the last few years (Msosa 1998, Malawi Government and
World Bank 2000). In the rest of this section we shall look more closely at the Civil
Service Action Plan on which the government based its hopes for a reformed and efficient
civil service.
3.2. The civil service action plan
In 1996, the government launched the Civil Service Action Plan (CSAP). It is one of the
most comprehensive reform plans ever attempted in Malawi, with a detailed description of
the actions and activities to be undertaken, including timetable and deadlines, as well as
identification of the ministries or agencies responsible for implementing the various6
segments of the programme. The aim of CSAP was to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the civil service by restructuring the establishment and retrenching staff.
The government also sought to improve financial and human resources management, and
generally to better manage the process of changing the public sector (Lungo and Mugore
1999).
Four years after the introduction of the CSAP, the government had completed a census of
the civil service, done strategic and functional reviews of its ministries, laid down plans for
contracting out some services, such as cleaning and security provision, to the private
sector, and retrenched about 20,000 temporary employees. Nearing completion was a job
evaluation and personnel audit for the civil service. However, the above comprises a small
part of the total number of actions envisioned when CSAP was launched in 1996 and much
work remains to be done (Malawi Government 2000).
The slow implementation is partly to blame on the low level of political consultation
during the initiation of CSAP. The latter was designed by a small number of civil servants,
working under pressure from domestic politicians and donors. There was insufficient
interaction with the cabinet, civil servants and other stakeholders. One consequence of this
was that neither the members of the Cabinet Committee on Public and Civil Service
Reform, which was formed to oversee the reform exercise, nor employees in the ministries
felt a high degree of ownership of the programme. Moreover, poor consultation aside, the
fact that the reform was focused on retrenchment, privatisation and contracting out, with
little effort expended on capacity and institution building, further alienated civil servants
who feared loss of employment. Equally important, absence of the involvement of civil
society meant that a potential source of pressure for rapid implementation of the new
reforms had been expurgated (Lungo and Mugore 1999).
The design of CSAP also had serious flaws. It was, for example, far from clear who was
ultimately responsible for the programme implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In
the case of the latter, progress was gauged on the basis of very simple indicators. The lack
of a clearly defined implementing authority also led to poor sequencing of interventions.
Without a plan of implementation, the CSAP became a mere list of initiatives. Line
ministries acted autonomously in requesting support from donors for projects and the
process became uncoordinated.
The functional reviews of the ministries were an important aspect of the civil service
reform. The goals of the reviews included defining mission statements for the ministries,
streamlining organisational structures and clarifying issues of accountability and
responsibility at all levels of government. Furthermore, the reviews looked at staffing
levels with a view to eliminating the duplication of functions by ministries.
The functional review programme was managed by the Public Sector Change Management
Agency, which commissioned the reviews and suggested the required interventions to the
cabinet. In the beginning the reviews were done more or less according to plan. However,
with time the speed of execution declined. Thus instead of completing work at the
beginning of 1998 as planned, it was not completed until the beginning of 2001.
Initially the functional reviews had important policy impacts. For example, the number of
ministries was reduced by 7 to 19, while a number of functions for contracting out were
identified. Still, the reduction in the number of ministries does not seem to have reduced7
the number of civil servants. Individuals and functions were simply transferred to other
ministries. Efforts at contracting out activities also encountered serious problems. The
contracting-out unit was not ready in time, while the capacity in the private sector for
service provision on behalf of the public sector was limited. The government also had a
poor record of payment for services rendered and many private companies were reluctant
to tender for the new functions being contracted out. Moreover, for similar reasons, banks
were not willing to finance firms, even after being awarded contracts by the government.
This cautious response on the part of the private sector meant that the envisaged massive
reduction in civil servants due to contracting out was not realised (see Msosa 1998).
A typical aspect of the lack of coordination in the CSAP is the omission of the functional
reviews regarding decentralisation. For example, while the functional review of the
Ministry of Education Science and Technology was completed promptly, it was largely
irrelevant as it failed to take into consideration the fact that responsibility for the schools
was to be transferred to the local governments.
Another key part of the CSAP was the implementation of a Medium Term Expenditure
Framework (MTEF). Two pressing issues necessitated its introduction. First, it was
necessary to abandon the hitherto incremental basis for recurrent budget preparation
towards more emphasis on outcomes. Second, budgets were typically prepared for a single
year with a demarcation between development and recurrent expenditures. However, since
development budgets generate recurrent expenditures of their own, but often not budgeted
for, it was important to prepare budgets that anticipate medium-term outcomes. Under the
MTEF, the recurrent and development budgets will be integrated. The budget process will
change from being an inventory of inputs, adjusted on a discretionary basis, to an outcomes
oriented framework, that focuses on outputs, the costing of priority activities and medium-
term projections of available resources (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
2000).
The reform of the budget process has turned out to be much more difficult to implement
than anticipated. In application, the MTEF entailed more drastic changes in organisational
structure, operation of the ministries as well as behaviour of civil servants than the
government could muster. A recent evaluation has concluded that after five years of
budgetary reform, the budget process remained incomplete (Ministry of Finance and
Economic Planning 2000). Thus while budgetary allocations to priority sectors, such as
health and education, have increased in the recent past, this was more the result of cabinet
level interventions than of improved cost and benefit analyses of expenditure.
4. Employment and wages in the public sector
As in other African countries, the post-independence years in Malawi have seen a rapid
expansion in civil service employment, at the same time as wages in the sector experienced
a dramatic decline in real terms accompanied by sharp wage compression. At the
beginning of the 1960s, the civil service (defined as the public sector less police, parastatal
and local government employees) totalled only about 10,700 employees. Partly to cater for
the increased demand for services and to create employment, the number of civil servants
increased by 13 percent per year during the first twenty years of independence. During the
1990s, the expansion continued, reaching a total of 127,000 civil servants by 1998 (Malawi
Government 1998). However, as part of the civil service reform, the government attempted8
to stop the expansion of its labour force. Since 1995, about 20,000 temporary employees
have been retrenched and ghost workers eliminated (Malawi Government 2000). Still, by
the beginning of the new millennium, the number of civil servants had increased to
130,000.3
However, although the focus on numbers seems to suggest that there still are too many
civil servants in Malawi, the opposite might indeed be the case. Looked at as a provider of
services for a population of up to 10.5 million people, the size of the civil service is not
excessive. Civil servants are only about 1.2 percent of the total population. This figure,
while comparable to those for other African countries, is very low compared to developed
countries in general and to the welfare states of Europe in particular (Lienert and Modi
1997). Moreover, taking into account that almost half of the civil servants are currently
employed as teachers in the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, only about
65,000 are left to run state administration and public hospitals. Thus, on the face of it, there
is no compelling reason for reducing the size of the Malawian civil service per se,
especially given the serious shortages of personnel in some of the most vital sectors, such
as education and health (Malawi Government and World Bank 2000).
Ultimately, however, the size of the civil service depends on the level that the government
can afford, on its own or with the assistance of the donor community. Thus, looked at from
the point of view of economic efficiency and affordability, employment in Malawi’s civil
service is large. The service employs about 20 percent of the formal sector labour force,
excluding agriculture and estates. In the 1990s, close to half of all the country’s
professionals and more than two thirds of its sub-professionals were working for the
government (World Bank 1994). A large civil service that is not adequately remunerated
will not only become a burden on state finances it also distorts relative wages in the rest of
the economy. What then goes on in the civil service plays an unduly large role in the
determination of employment and wages in the rest of the economy. Moreover, the
hoarding of professionals and technicians in low productivity government employment
retards the development of the private sector.
In the proceeding section, we look at the evolution of wages and wage related costs in the
Malawian civil service, and between the civil service and the private sector. Three
questions are asked: How have wage costs as well as real wages evolved in the past
decades. What factors have determined the sharp wage compression in Malawi? How do
civil service sector wages compare with those in the private sector?
In the 1980s, after close to two decades of relatively good economic performance, the
public sector wage bill, as a share of GDP and public expenditure, respectively, was, at 5.3
and 16.4, higher in Malawi than in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 1). For the
period from 1990, the pattern was reversed, with wages growing much slower in Malawi
than in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, in light of the decline in public service
provision in the 1990s, it is doubtful whether raising the public sector wage bill, without
steps at restructuring the sector, is prudent. As illustrated by Figure 1, which depicts
developments for selected wage categories, (see also Appendix 1) salaries and wages have
declined by more than 60 percent in Malawi since the beginning of the 1980s. Between
1982 and 2000, for example, the top scale in the civil service (S1), that of the Chief Justice,
3 The Nation, 1 March 2001.9
declined by 63 percent, while that of a Senior Administrative Officer in government (S8)
declined by 82 percent. Mid level grades, for example Clerical Officers with Diplomas
(E0/T0), have seen similar declines, an average of 56 percent. For some in the lower
grades, declines have been lower, below 30 percent, although some categories saw declines
of over 50 percent. It is noteworthy that the increasing militancy of the otherwise
traditionally docile civil service workforce, resorting to strikes when need be, has not
reversed this downward trend in real wages (Ademolekun and Mvula 1999).
Table 1
Wage costs as a share of GDP and government expenditure in Malawi
and Sub-Saharan Africa (in percent)
1980-4 1985-9 1990-4 1995-8
Malawi Wages/GDP 5.3 5.3 6.5 6.5
Sub-Saharan Africa Wages/GDP 3.7 3.3 7.2 7.7
Malawi Wages/Expenditure 16.4 16.3 18.5 21.1
Sub-Saharan Africa Wages/Expenditure 14.7 12.2 24.6 27.3
Source: World Bank (2000), African Development Indicators 2000.
Notes: Government expenditure is measured as total expenditure and lending minus repayments.
Figure 1
The Evolution of Real Salaries and Wages for some Grades 1982-2000 (1982=100)
Notes: The salaries are designated as follows: S1=Chief Justice, S2=Attorney General, S8=Senior
Administrative Officer, E0/T0=Clerical Officer with Diploma, C0/TA=Technical Assistant, SCIV=Messenger.
The salaries were first converted to constant 1995 Malawi Kwachas using the consumer price index. Then all
were normalised to 100 in 1982. See Appendix 1 for sources.
Another interesting feature of wage developments in Malawi relates to the severe
compression that resulted from decades of parsimonious adjustments, via wage reviews
and recommendations from commissions, but failing to improve incentives in the system







































the board (Table 2). There are two striking features of these changes. First, although the
nominal increases were sometimes evenly distributed, most often they were not. For
instance, the revisions that took place in 1986 were clearly biased in favour of higher
salary grades, this was reversed in 1989 when wages for lower grades rose by well over 40
percent. In 1992, adjustments favoured the mid level grades while in the year that followed
lower grades saw their wages increasing strongly once again. Since 1997, wage increases
have been equally distributed across the various grades.
Table 2
Nominal salary adjustments for select grades (1982-2000) in percent
Salary Grades 1982-6 1986-9 1989-92 1992-3 1993-4 1994-5 1995-6 1996-7 1997-00
Super scale
S1 63 12 80 0 21 44 88 10 83
S2C 44 47 10 83
S2B 64 12 80 0 18 44 47 10 83
S2A 53 12 81 0 20 44 47 10 83
S2 43 12 83 0 22 44 48 10 83
S3 44 12 83 9 13 44 34 10 83
S4 43 12 83 9 13 44 35 10 83
S5 42 12 81 9 14 44 35 10 83
S6 39 13 78 9 14 44 15 10 83
S7 35 13 73 9 15 44 16 10 83
S8 30 12 68 9 15 44 18 10 83
Adm. & Professional
A 0 / P 0 1 54 24 42 41 7 8 3
Executive & Technical
C E 0 / C T 0 3 02 0 6 81 51 64 42 41 7 8 3
S E 0 / S T 0 3 13 0 6 81 52 44 41 92 5 8 3
E 0 / T 0 3 15 4 8 22 55 04 41 32 5 8 3
Junior Tech./Clerical
SC0/STA 28 20 106 25 50 44 15 25 83
CO/TA 29 25 160 30 122 44 13 25 83
Subordinate Staff
SCI 26 20 80 30 113 44 13 25 83
SCII 25 20 80 30 109 44 13 25 83
SCIII 27 43 92 30 77 44 13 35 83
SCIV 27 85 97 30 59 44 13 47 83
Source: See Appendix 1.
The abrupt and uneven adjustments in the salary scales depicted in Table 2 illustrate a lack
of continuity in public sector pay policies. The authorities have essentially been crisis
managers in the past decades, with little strategic planning. Adjustments were invariably
responses to mounting discontent from civil servants than results of well thought out
strategies that were consistent with the country’s fiscal standing. In the midst of labour
unrest, there would be a one-off increase in wages, followed by policy inactivity until the11
next crisis. Since large and unplanned salary adjustments led to distortions of the economy-
wide pay structure, they affected overall work effort negatively, especially since they bred
discontent in other sectors of the economy and led to inflationary pressure.
The wage compression that resulted from the Africanisation of the civil service after
independence has remained at the core of the incentive problems in Malawi’s civil service.
While the reduction in salary levels had affected those in the top grades most, and the
narrowing of wage differentials was probably initially defendable on efficiency grounds,
the persistence of wage compression has distorted the incentive structure in the civil
service. The government has had to resort to non-wage complements of various types to
keep its labour force motivated. Figure 2, illustrates the compression factors for major
salary grades over the period 1982-2000. They range from the top category (S1), that of the
Chief Justice, to the lowest level (SCIV) of subordinate staff (see also Table 2). The
compression factors are ratios of each grade’s salary level and that of subordinate staff. A
ratio of unity implies that compression is complete, with all grades enjoying the same
salary complement.
Figure 2
Compression factors by year: major salary grades as ratios of lowest grade, SCIV
(1982-2000)
Notes: The designation 1 on the horizontal axis stands for the salary level of the Chief Justice, levels then
decline downwards to that of the Messenger, 19. The compression factors were calculated as ratios between
each grade and the lowest one (SCIV). See Appendix 1 for sources.
Although the compression of salaries has been a common phenomenon in African public
services, it has been driven to extremes in poor countries like Malawi (see Liernert and
Modi 1997; World Bank 1994). Thus while at the beginning of the 1980s, top government
employees were earning up to 45 times more than the lowest paid messenger, the gaps had
been reduced to only between 12 to 18 times in the decade that followed. The compression






















The government attempted to reverse the effects of wage compression by inventing a
variety of employment benefits, notably housing and transport allowances. Top civil
servants travel abroad at frequent intervals, which enables them to generate extra income
via per diem and related allowances. Training workshops and conferences, where
allowances are paid for attendance, are also common, in many cases sponsored by donors
(Government of Malawi and World Bank 2000). More often than not, however, employees
attempt to supplement their incomes by ‘privatising’ public property, such as official
stamps, demanding a fee for them. Medicines are stolen from hospitals, while government
vehicles are used for private businesses. Shirking is common while some individuals
simply abscond from duty while continuing to draw salaries from the government.
How do public sector salaries and wages compare with those of private sector? Comparing
wage levels in the two sectors is difficult. First, within the private sector the pay levels
vary across employers, with some paying much less than minimum salaries in the civil
service, while others that pay up to 30 percent more for staff with similar levels of training
(World Bank 1994). Second, comparisons should ideally be made between jobs held by
individuals with similar training and experience. Last, in addition to salaries, one also
needs to look at monetary and non-monetary benefits, although the latter can be difficult to
quantify.
A study of pay by sector done by the ILO (1989) found that basic salaries among
professionals in the private sector were about 150 percent higher than in government, with
sub-professional categories in the private sector enjoying 45 percent higher wages. Only
among the low-skilled occupations did civil servants earn a little more, 4 percent, than
those in the private sector. On the basis of an extensive survey, the World Bank (1994) was
able to put value on the various non-monetary benefits attached to these jobs. When these
were added to salaries and wages, the pay gap between professionals in the private sector
and civil service was reduced to 60 per cent. For the middle and junior grades in the civil
service, with subsidized housing, the total remuneration package was in fact better than in
the private sector.
However, during the period 1993 to 1999, private sector salaries grew much faster than in
the public sector. In real terms, salaries for high-ranking civil servants decreased by about
50 percent over the period while they increased by six times for top jobs in the private
sector (Malawi Government and World Bank 2000). Lower grades were similarly lagging
behind their equivalents in the private sector. At the end of 1999, a civil service extension
worker earned US$41 per month after tax, and including benefits, while extension workers
employed by NGOs earned three times as much (Moll 2000).
The Ministry of Health and Population provides an example of the consequences of low
salaries and wages. Although the share of public expenditure going to personal
emoluments increased from 24 percent to 39 percent over the period 1990 to 1997 as part
of a deliberate effort to maintain reasonable salary levels, there were large-scale
resignations from the ministry. By 1999 up to 50 percent of the employees had left, mostly
doctors, nurses and other clinical staff, and most vacancies remained unfilled (Malawi
Government and World Bank 2000).
In modern economics, a central component of the incentive structure is ability to relate
inputs and outcomes to wage compensation (Lazear 1995). This approach is, however,
rarely practised in Malawi. The information required for its operation is simply not13
available. Another reason is that for most jobs in the civil service, it is difficult to establish
a clear link between human resource inputs and the quantity and quality of the service
provided. But even when the latter is possible, incentives based on outputs could go wrong.
If, for example, health clinics are compensated for the number of vaccinations carried out,
they might neglect other aspects of primary care and treatment.
Nevertheless, a job restructuring exercise is under way in Malawi and new employment
contracts have been introduced. Some institutions, such as the Anti-Corruption Bureau
(ACB)4 and Malawi Revenue Authority, now use employment contracts that relate pay to
either individual performance or outcomes. During 2000, senior civil servants from Deputy
Secretary and above, were given the option to switch to performance-based contracts of a
three-year duration, with pay levels that were about 500 percent above current ones. Still,
initially only those close to retirement accepted performance-based contracts, since they
had little to lose, while others hesitated for fear of unfair performance appraisals and
anxiety regarding the sustainability of the system itself. More recently, however, more
individuals have opted for the new scheme.
As already noted, the success of a system based on salary enhancement rests on ability to
design a credible system of performance evaluation. It is not self-evident how to measure
the output of a Principal Secretary, for example. Ultimately, the procedure used must
combine objective measurement with a degree of subjectivity. This implies, in turn, that
other considerations, such as politics and ethnic bias, might distort the evaluation.
5. Accountability in the public sector
A key goal of the reform of the civil service has been to raise accountability in the public
sector. Lack of accountability has serious implications for the use of resources in ministries
and departments. Without accountability, many important initiatives by the government
will have little effect. For example, the introduction of a cash-budget in Malawi in 1994
was meant to instil a high level of accountability in the budgetary process and also to
reduce discretionary expenditures in the ministries. Still, poor accountability led to the
build up of arrears. Private sector firms have been willing to supply goods and services on
credit to government departments on the strength of promises of future payment. This has
helped senior officers to maintain their activities. In other cases, cash-strapped departments
continue to consume public utilities, including water, electricity and telecommunications,
while refusing to pay for the accumulated bills.
To increase accountability in government demands not only reforms of the nature
described in the sections above, but also concerted actions directed against corruption in
public life. In 1994, a new constitution was written which expressed a commitment to
political pluralism and good governance. As a result, the latter part of the 1990s saw the
establishment of institutions like the Ombudsman, Electoral Commission, Compensation
Tribunal, and the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB).
Corruption is a big problem in Malawi, as indeed in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. The
new government thus sought support from the World Bank to put into place policies to
4 The experience of the ACB is discussed in some detail further below.14
address it. Already in 1995, Parliament passed the Corrupt Practice Act. The leadership of
the Anti-Corruption Bureau was appointed in 1997, with operations commencing a year
later. The Bureau’s mandate is to investigate and prosecute offences of corruption,
empower civil society via education and information to fight corruption and deter
corruption in all its various forms.
The ACB has gained a reputation for efficiency. Its corruption fighting activities have led
to the dismissal of at least four ministers and several senior civil servants. In 2001 a further
two ministers were on trial for corruption along with a large number of civil servants. The
causes of the ACB’s relatively high efficiency are illustrative. First, it enjoys the political
support of the President. This implies that lower instances are not able to interfere. Second,
the staff of the institution was handpicked, with emphasis put on relevant qualifications
and experience. Further, the Bureau hired experienced expatriates who brought with them
the know-how that gave the institution confidence.
Employees at the ACB work on the basis of three-year contracts. Their remuneration is
several times that of civil servants in other departments. The salary of a senior investigator
is, for example, about MK30,000 a month. This is supplemented by a housing allowance
(MK15,500), a duty allowance (MK4,500) and a 25 percent taxfree gratuity at the end of
the contract. This amounts to approximately MK53,000 (currently US$660). In addition,
the investigator gets MK980 per day to cover personal expenses when travelling within in
Malawi and US$250 when travelling abroad. Moreover, the medical expenses of the
employee’s family are covered by the ACB.
Monitoring and evaluation of ACB’s performance is done every year. Each employee
prepares a report on own activities during the year under review and presents it to an
evaluation team made up of six people, including peers, supervisors, and an external
human resource officer. The team members then assess aspects of the employee’s
performance. The average score is then used to determine whether the salary should be
increased and by how much. While the above pay increases are purely on merit, ACB staff
also enjoy the salary increases that accrue to the rest of the civil service. So far this system
has worked well, since discrepancies in assessment by the evaluation team members are
small the system has achieved credibility.
6. Concluding remarks
The Malawian authorities have since 1994 implemented public sector reforms with the
goal of increasing efficiency in the delivery of social services. However, although some
institutions, such as the new Anti-Corruption Bureau, appear to perform well above
average, the progress made so far has been slow and far between. Still, the reform of the
public sector is considered a long-term process and it has been important to learn from past
mistakes.
Lack of accountability remains a serious impediment to raising efficiency in the public
sector in Malawi. A number of issues need to be addressed in this regard including the
incentive structure, transparency, monitoring, evaluation, and the disciplinary regime.
There seems to be problems with all these factors in Malawi. Basic salaries are low, in real
terms and relative to the private sector, and there has been a serious compression of the
salary structure since the 1980s. On the other hand, the level of transparency, as well as15
compliance with rules and regulations remains low. But a perhaps more serious cause for
concern is the lack of a system that sanctions those that break the rules. Before democracy
was re-introduced in Malawi, with the elections of 1994, accountability in government was
upheld by a strict code of civil service conduct. Then, a mere suspicion of wrongdoing was
enough to send civil servants to jail. Since this rigorous system has not been replaced with
an effective system of deterrence under the new regime, democracy is sometimes blamed
for increasing corruption and lethargy in the civil service.
The low level of accountability has also affected the government’s budgeting process. Five
years after the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework was introduced, there are still large
discrepancies between policy goals, implementation and results. Evaluation of the
outcomes is made difficult by the poor feedback from end-users, for example those
receiving primary health care in the countryside. Lacking this information, it is difficult to
assess the impact of the reforms, and how to adjust future budgets in order to improve the
public sector’s capacity to target the vulnerable groups.
An important lesson to learn from the Malawian experience is the necessity of public
reforms to have champions across the length of the political hierarchy. At each level of
administration, somebody has to take on the responsibility of pushing the reform forward.
This also relates to the question of ownership. There are many cases where the
implementation of a programme has depended on the exertion of pressure by multilateral
and bilateral donors, often alienating civil servants in the process. Programmes so
implemented are prone to fail. Many donors now realise that, while they will need to
continue providing the requisite financing and technical assistance, Malawian authorities
must run the process if it is to have any chance of success. It is also necessary to encourage
agencies outside government, such as civil society, business associations and academics to
take active part in the development debate. This would broaden support for the reforms
pursued and check government excesses.
Finally, in spite of the problems in the Malawian public sector listed above and the
substantial amount of work still to be done, the government has taken important reform
measures in the past few years. The reforms have been of a three-pronged nature. First has
been a focus on the creation of incentives for improved performance in the civil service,
second is the emphasis on inclusion and a participatory approach, third is the attempt to
boost the institutions of the public sector, raising their efficiency and reducing corruption.
The enhancement of the terms of service in government in recent years, creation of the
office of the Ombudsman and Anti-Corruption Bureau to act as checks on government
excesses are examples of the recent policy thrust. So far, progress in public sector reforms
has been made thanks to political support from the President. However, for public sector
reform to be sustained in Malawi, it will be necessary to incorporate broader sections of the
population into the process.16
Appendix Table
Salaries and wages for select grades (in MK and US$)
Salary Grades Representative/Generic Job Titles Annual Salaries
(Dec. 2000)
Super scale, Administrative roles MK $US
S1 SPC, Chief Justice 239483 2994
S2C Deputy SPC 178397 2230
S2A Attorney General 160785 2010
S2 Principal Secretary 153034 1913
S3 Senior DPSs, Ambassador 128010 1600
S4 DPS's 118467 1481
S5 Chief, Under Secretaries 108325 1354
S6 Senior Assistant Secretary 84018 1050
S7 Principal Admin. Officer 76029 950
S8 Senior Admin. Officer 68159 852
Super-scale, Professional
P1 Chief Specialist 239483 2994
P2 Controller, Commissioner 153034 1913
P3 Principal Specialist 128010 1600
P4 Senior Specialist 118467 1481
P5 Chief Officer 108325 1354
P6 Assistant Chief Officer 84018 1050
P7 Principal Officer, (Medical Doctor) 76029 950
P8 Senior Officer, (Senior Accountant) 68159 852
Administrative and Professional
A0/P0 Prof. / Admin. Officer, (1st degree holder) 49969 625
CE0/CT0 Chief Exec. / Tech Officer (Accountant) 56962 712
SE0/ST0 Senior Exec. / Tech Officer 51921 649
E0/T0 Clerical Officers (Diploma holder) 39907 499
SC0/STA Clerical officer 35464 443
CO/TA Clerical / Technical Assistants (O-level) 20023 250
Subordinate Staff
SCI Messenger 24387 305
SCII Messenger 19366 242
SCIII Messenger 15541 194
SCIV Messenger 12970 162
Source: Government of Malawi.
Note: The salaries are minimum salaries within each grade as of December 2000. The exchange rate used
was MK80 per US$. Sources are World Bank (1994) and Department of Human Resource Management and
Development.
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